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              Abstract 
 
Group identification can lead to a biased view of the world in favor of “in-group” 
members. Studying the brain processes that underlie such in-group biases is important 
for a wider understanding of the potential influence of social factors on basic perceptual 
processes. In this study we used fMRI to investigate how people perceive the actions of 
in-group and out-group members, and how their biased view in favor of own-team 
members manifests itself in the brain. We divided participants into two teams and had 
them judge the relative speeds of hand actions performed by an in-group and an out-
group member in a competitive situation. Participants judged hand actions performed by 
in-group members as being faster than those of out-group members, even when the two 
actions were performed at physically identical speeds. In an additional fMRI experiment 
we showed that, contrary to common belief, such skewed impressions arise from a 
subtle bias in perception and associated brain activity rather than decision making 
processes, and that this bias develops rapidly and involuntarily as a consequence of 
group affiliation.  Our findings suggest that the neural mechanisms that underlie human 
perception are shaped by social context. 
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  Introduction  
 
People tend to evaluate the actions of their own group or team members more favorably 
than those of others. In a pioneering study by Hastorf and Cantril (1954), Princeton and 
Dartmouth students viewed a film of a contentious football game played between their 
two schools. The students’ versions of what transpired during the game were so wildly 
different that it almost appeared as if they had watched different games. Social 
categorization can change social perception even in a minimal group setting. For 
example, Bernstein et al. (2007) randomly divided individuals into two groups and 
found that people were better at recognizing faces of in-group members than of out-
group members, despite the fact that perceptual expertise was equivalent for in-group 
and out-group faces. Inter-group bias can occur under minimal conditions (Tajfel et al. 
1971; Turner, 1975) as an automatic process without awareness (Otten and Wentura, 
1999; Ashburn-Nado et al. 2001), implying that such a bias could manifest itself in 
brain regions involved in relatively non-conscious processing rather than at a later, 
conscious stage of  selection. Traditionally, ‘in-group’ biases have been explained in 
terms of social psychological motivations (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Hewstone et al. 
2002; Brewer, 2007) but little is known about their underlying neural mechanisms. 
 
A large part of the human brain is involved with social interactions and social cognition 
(Frith, 2007). The "social brain" enables us to differentiate between ourselves and 
others, and to recognize other's mental states, intentions, feelings, and emotions (Frith 
and Frith, 2007). Uddin et al. (2007) suggest that two distinct but interconnected 
networks form the basis of the “social brain” and are involved in understanding others; a 
fronto-parietal mirror-neuron system that allows understanding others through motor 
simulation or mirroring mechanisms (eg. Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010), and a 
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“mentalising” network comprised of midline cortical structures important for evaluation 
of others’ intentions, beliefs, and mental states (eg. Frith, 2001). 
 
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) have been 
identified as primary components of the cortical midline network (Blakemore, 2008; 
Uddin et al. 2007). Furthermore, the amygdala, which has been associated with 
emotional responses, seems to be a crucial brain region for social cognition (Blakemore, 
2008; Frith, 2007). These areas have been found to alter their activity as a function of 
ethnic or racial group biases. In particular, Cunningham et al. (2004) reported increased 
amygdala activity when White participants viewed brief, subconsciously presented 
photos of Black people. In contrast, when photos were consciously perceived this 
difference was significantly reduced, and regions of frontal cortex (ACC and PFC) 
associated with control and regulation showed greater activation for Black than White 
faces. Cunningham et al. (2004) suggested that participants attempt to control negative 
associations with their racial out-group when they are aware of the stimulus. Similarly, 
Richeson et al. (2003) reported that activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC) and ACC was positively correlated with racial bias, as measured by the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT), while Rilling et al. (2008) reported higher activation in the 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) during in-group interaction versus out-group 
interaction for participants who were biased towards in-group members. Rilling et al. 
(2008) further showed that brain activity was higher in the dlPFC during out-group 
interactions for participants who did not show an in-group bias, suggesting that those 
participants exerted greater cognitive effort to override their own biases. The medial 
PFC has also been identified as a region containing functions related to personal self 
(see Van Overwalle, 2009 for a meta-analysis). Based on social identity theory, Volz et 
al. (2009) hypothesised that because personal identity (knowledge about personal 
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identities) is interdependent on one’s social self (knowledge about shared attributes 
derived from our membership to certain groups), it is plausible to expect some overlap 
in related brain areas. Volz et al. (2009) argue that the social self is addressed during 
situations when evaluative group comparisons are made. In an fMRI study of a money 
awarding game under the minimal group paradigm, Volz et al. (2009) showed that the 
medial PFC (a region known to be involved in the personal self) was significantly more 
active in participants who acted with more bias compared to participants who 
predominantly showed neutral behaviour during the task. This result, in line with social 
identity theory, suggests that the assessment of personal self and social self involves 
similar functions and overlapping brain areas (Volz et al. 2009). Taken together, the 
findings of Cunningham et al. (2004), Richeson et al. (2003), Rilling et al. (2008) and 
Volz et al. (2009) provide evidence for differences in neural activity in response to 
ingroup and outgroup targets. It is important to note that two of the above studies 
(Cunningham et al. 2004; Richeson et al. 2003) used ethnic groups, which may lead 
participants to hide their racial biases. In turn, this cognitive effort may recruit brain 
areas that underlie inhibition and control functions. To conclude, these studies suggest 
that processing of social groups may be automatic, but executive functions can 
modulate automatic evaluations under certain conditions. Judgments leading to in-group 
bias are therefore suggested to result from social decision-making, relying on a network 
of brain regions including the ACC, medial prefrontal cortex and orbitofrontal cortex 
(Cunningham et al. 2004; Frith, 2007; Sanfey, 2007; Uddin et al. 2007; Blakemore, 
2008; Van Bavel et al. 2008).  
 
Although previous studies have tended to emphasize the role of cognitive-emotional 
factors in inter-group biases, neural mechanisms exist for the direct simulation or 
‘mirroring’ of others’ actions (Fabbri-Destro and Rizzolatti, 2008; Rizzolatti and 
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Fabbri-Destro, 2008), and these have been shown to be influenced by racial factors 
(Molnar-Szakacs et al. 2007; Avenanti et al. 2010). For example Molnar-Szakacs et al. 
(2007) showed in a TMS experiment that corticospinal excitability during observation 
of in-group culture-specific emblems (autonomous gestures that are highly social in 
nature) was higher when performed by an in-group member than an out-group member. 
They argue that unconscious mirror mechanisms were modulated by interacting 
biological and cultural factors so that when we observe the actions of an ethnic and 
cultural in-group member, we show stronger motor resonance.  Intergroup bias in action 
perception may therefore arise from differences in neural mechanisms associated with 
the perception of goal-directed actions, involving brain regions such as the superior 
temporal sulcus, inferior parietal lobule and pars opercularis and adjacent ventral 
premotor cortex (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Blake and Schiffrar, 2007), rather than 
solely from cognitive judgments or social motivations. In a previous fMRI study 
investigating in-group bias using a minimal group paradigm, Van Bavel et al. (2008) 
found that faces of in-group members are processed in more depth (revealed by greater 
fusiform gyrus activity) than faces of out-group members, which might imply that 
participants process other team members in a different way than own team members. 
Moreover, activity in orbitofrontal cortex mediated the in-group bias in self-reported 
liking for the faces. These in-group biases in neural activity were not moderated by 
whether participants explicitly attended to team membership, which suggests that they 
might arise automatically. In a similar way regions involved in action perception could 
be automatically modulated by team membership.  
 
To investigate the effect of group membership on perception of action, in the current 
study we arbitrarily allocated adult volunteers to one of two teams (“Red” or “Blue”). 
After consolidating group membership and testing the strength of implicit association 
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with red or blue teams using the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al. 1998; 
Greenwald et al. 2009), participants judged the speed of goal-directed actions in pairs of 
video clips of in-group and out-group members in a competitive context. We carefully 
controlled the actual time difference between actions of Red and Blue team members in 
the paired videos, and plotted the psychophysical function of participants’ judgments of 
which team was faster against the actual time difference between depicted actions. We 
expected participants to show an in-group bias, judging the actions of own-team 
members as faster than identical actions of other-team members. This behavioral action-
judgment task was used to establish that participants showed a measurable and reliable 
bias towards own-team actions in this group paradigm. The behavioral task alone, 
however, cannot reveal why such biases arise – whether they are due purely to 
social/cognitive, decision-level processes or whether in-group biases also involve 
differences in the neural processes underlying action perception. To resolve this issue 
we performed an fMRI experiment in which participants viewed actions of in-group and 
out-group members in a competitive situation.  
 
On some trials, only a single video of the own-team or other-team member was 
presented, although the participant still expected a second comparison video to follow. 
These trials enabled us to examine neural activity associated specifically with 
perception of action of own-team and other-team members separately. If people who 
show in-group bias perceive the actions of own-team members differently to those of 
other-team members, we would expect to see a difference in brain regions involved in 
action perception such as the superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Blake and Schiffrar, 
2007), the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and the pars opercularis and adjacent ventral 
premotor cortex (pars opercularis/vPM) (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). The STS is 
known to be involved in the analysis of “social” biological motion (Allison et al. 2000; 
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Saxe et al. 2004; Wyk et al. 2009). The other two regions are part of a fronto-parietal 
mirror circuit important in visual-motor transformation (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 
2010). Because people imitate in-group members more easily than out-group members 
(Yabar et al. 2006; Molnar-Szakacs et al. 2007), and because in-group members are 
processed in greater depth than out-group members (Bernstein et al. 2007; Golby et al. 
2001; Van Bavel et al. 2008), we expected these regions to be more active during the 
perception of in-group members’ actions in those participants who show an in-group 
bias.  
    
On other trials of the fMRI experiment, participants viewed both own-team and other-
team actions and made judgments on who was faster, allowing us to examine neural 
activity associated with judgments of in-group versus out-group actions. If decision 
making processes are crucial for in-group biases, we expected regions such as the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), that have previously been associated with decision making 
in general (Heekeren et al. 2008), as well as cognitive control in social perception 
(Cunningham et al. 2004) to be more active when participants chose their own-team 
actions as faster compared with other-team actions. 
.  
Material and methods 
 
Participants. Two independent groups of participants were recruited: 24 volunteers 
ranging in age from 17 to 39 years (M= 21.8 years) completed the behavioral action 
judgment task, and another 24 volunteers, ranging in age from 17 to 43 years (M= 23.8 
years), completed the fMRI action-perception task. To ensure that gender (Sidanius et 
al. 2000; Dambrun et al. 2004) and ethnicity (Vanman et al. 2004) did not interfere with 
9 
 
group identification, the sample comprised Caucasian males only. All participants were 
right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and had no history of 
mental or neurological diseases. All experimental procedures were approved by the 
Medical Research Ethics Committee of The University of Queensland.  
 
Team Allocation. All participants were first allocated to Red and Blue teams. For this 
allocation, participants were asked to estimate the number of dots in a randomly-
dispersed array of 84 black dots on a white background. Participants were seated 114 
cm from a 17-inch computer screen and a two-button response box was fixed to a table 
on the participant's right hand side. All aspects of experimental stimulus delivery were 
presented with E-prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools) software. Participants were 
told that their team assignment would be based on their response (over- or 
underestimation of the number of dots), although allocation was in fact randomized 
(Tajfel et al. 1971) and no information about the performance was given to the 
participants. For the remainder of the study, participants then wore a red or blue jacket, 
as appropriate for their team. 
 
Next, to consolidate group identification (Sherif et al. 1961) and enhance in-group 
versus out-group distinctiveness (Brewer, 1979), all participants performed a team-
competition task in which they were told that they were competing against a member of 
the other team. Participants reached as quickly as possible to press a response button 
with their right hand (50 cm from the resting hand position) after a “GO-signal” was 
presented on the computer display. A warning cue (“Get Ready”) was always displayed 
at 1 s, 2 s or 3 s before the "GO" cue. Participants were told that their response times 
would be compared with the pre-recorded response times of an opposing-team member, 
and to give this appearance the word "Checking…" appeared immediately after the 
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action, followed by a feedback display indicating "RED WINS" or "BLUE WINS". 
Feedback was actually pseudo-randomly selected, with each participant “winning” 50% 
of trials. If participants’ responses took longer than 700 ms, the opposing team was 
shown as the winner to ensure that participants remained unaware of the randomized 
nature of feedback when they responded too slowly. Participants completed 18 trials of 
this competition task over approximately 5 minutes. 
 
Action Judgment Task. Following the team-competition task, the first group of 24 
participants performed a novel Action Judgment Task. This task was critical for 
measuring group bias in action judgments. Participants viewed pairs of video clips of 
rapid reaching actions made by red and blue team members, and were asked to judge 
which was faster (Figure 1A). Video clips showed a hand-action model, in a red or blue 
jacket, performing a rapid reaching movement with his right hand, starting from a 
resting position and reaching to press a button at a distance of approximately 50 cm in 
front of his body, before returning to the start position. The videos were edited with 
Sony Vegas Movie Studio 9 (Sony Media Software) so that the duration of the actions 
depicted, from the onset of movement until the model’s hand reached the button, was 
strictly controlled by the number of video frames: either 233, 300, 367 or 433 ms 
duration (7, 9, 11 or 13 video frames at 30 frames per second). When paired together in 
all possible 32 combinations (see Supplementary Table 1) this yielded seven 
experimental conditions in which the action durations differed by exactly +200, +133, 
+67, 0, -67, -133, or -200 ms. All video clips were exactly 1500 ms duration, with 
movement onset beginning at 167 ms (frame 5). All combinations of action durations 
were presented equally often, randomly mixed, over 2 sessions of 64 trials per session. 
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Crucially, identical video clips were shown to all participants, so that those representing 
“own-team” for one group of participants were the same as those representing “other-
team” for the other group of participants. In this way, any differences between the 
judgments on own-team and other-team videos could not be attributed to any subtle 
physical differences between the videos themselves. Four different hand-action models 
were depicted in the videos, and the team they represented was counterbalanced across 
participant groups. Participants received no feedback on the accuracy of their 
judgments. 
 
To calculate the judgment bias in function of time difference between own-team versus 
other-team actions, the percentage of “own-team faster” responses was calculated and 
plotted as a function the actual time difference between actions depicted in the videos. 
This psychophysical function, representing the relationship between perceived and 
actual speed of actions, was fitted with a 3-parameter sigmoid function y= a/(1+exp(-(x-
x0)/b)) using SigmaPlot 11.0 (Systat software). Each participant’s judgment bias was 
calculated by finding the actual time difference between own-team versus other-team 
actions (x-axis) at which perceptual responses of “own-team faster” was equal to 50% 
(y-axis) on their individual fitted sigmoid function [using the formula x = -LN((a/y)-
1)*b + x0].  
 
Functional MRI Action Judgment Task. Following the team-competition task, the 
second group of 24 participants performed a modified version of the Action Judgment 
Task during functional MRI measurement. In this modified task, only two durations of 
actions were depicted in the video clips (300 and 367 ms) so that paired videos showed 
own-team and other-team actions that differed by either +67, 0, or -67 ms. Each trial 
consisted either of a pair of video clips, as in the standard action judgment task, or a 
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single video clip showing an action performed by an own-team or other-team member 
(Figure 1B). For the paired-video trials, as in the standard action judgment task, 
participants pressed a button after viewing the two actions to indicate which of the 
actions they judged as faster. For the single-video trials, only the initial “Your Team” or 
“Other Team” text and the relevant video clip were presented, with a fixation cross 
presented for the remainder of the inter-trial interval (5500 ms). These single-video 
trials were mixed randomly with the paired-video trials so that participants were not 
aware of the trial type while viewing the initial video clips. In the paired-video trials the 
two video clips are too close in time to analyze the activity associated with watching 
own team and others team videos separately; therefore we included the single-video 
trials. This condition allowed us to compare brain activation associated with the visual 
processing of own-team versus other-team videos in isolation, without any possible 
confounding effects of seeing both team videos and making judgments about teams.  
 
As a baseline comparison condition, a Press Task was also included in which the final 
stimulus screen instructed participants to “Press Left” or “Press Right”, rather than 
judging “Who was faster?”. When contrasted with the paired-video action-judgment 
trials, the Press Task allowed us to examine neural activity associated with making 
explicit judgments on who was faster. As a resting control condition, 16 trials involved 
only a fixation cross presented for the entire 8 s trial duration. This allowed us to plot 
the level of activation (% signal change) during the single-video trials compared with a 
passive-fixation control condition. 
 
The overall sequence of stimuli within trials for the paired video clips was identical to 
that in the standard action judgment task (see Figure 1A), except that a fixed 3 s inter-
trial interval was used to keep overall trial durations fixed. The order of in-group and 
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out-group video clips and action durations was counterbalanced across participants. The 
entire task was conducted in 4 repeated fMRI runs, each of approximately 9 min 
duration and consisting of 64 trials in total. There were 16 trials for each within-subject 
condition: 32 paired-video trials, half requiring action judgments and half press 
left/right; 16 single-video trials, half showing own-team and half other-team; and 16 
baseline fixation trials. 
 
Immediately following the fMRI Action Judgment Task, we also conducted an 
additional single fMRI run in which participants passively viewed the same own-team 
and other-team action video clips in blocks alternating with rest. This control 
experiment allowed us to examine whether any difference existed in neural activity for 
own-team and other-team actions during purely passive observation. Videos of own-
team and other-team actions were presented in blocks to optimize the power of the 
design of 24 s duration (12 trials of 1500 ms video clip plus 500 ms fixation inter-
stimulus interval), alternating with 16 s baseline fixation. Each participant viewed 4 
blocks of own-team and 4 blocks of other-team actions.   
 
Implicit Association Test (IAT). Following the Action Judgment Task, all participants 
performed the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al. 1998), in order to verify 
that each group identified more with their own team members than with opposing team 
members (see Supplementary Figure 1). In the critical conditions of our IAT task, 
participants simultaneously categorized words as pleasant or unpleasant, and photos of 
team members as own-team or other-team, by pressing left or right buttons. If 
participants form significant group associations, they should respond faster in a 
congruent condition, when own-team photos and positive words are associated with one 
response (e.g., left button press) and other-team photos and negative words are 
14 
 
associated with the other response (e.g., right button), than the reverse configuration in 
which own-team photos and negative words are mapped to the same response. The 
modified IAT consisted of five parts: three parts for learning associations between 
concepts and response hands (Parts 1, 2, and 4) and two critical, combined tasks (Parts 3 
and 5) during which response times were measured and compared. For the initial target-
concept discrimination, photographs of a red or blue team member were presented in the 
center of the display with category labels “Red Team” and “Blue Team” presented in 
left and right top corners of the display. Participants pressed left or right response 
buttons to classify photographs as red or blue team members. The photographs showed 
one of eight Caucasian males wearing a blue or a red jacket, with each model shown 
twice over 16 trials. Next, for the associated attribute discrimination, pleasant or 
unpleasant words were presented in the center of the display, with the category labels 
“Unpleasant” and “Pleasant” presented in left and right top corners of the display. 
Participants pressed the left or right response buttons to classify words as unpleasant or 
pleasant. Four unpleasant words (enemy, evil, rotten, hatred) and four pleasant words 
(friend, honest, loyal, happy) were each presented twice over 16 trials. 
 
For the critical combined tasks (Parts 3 and 5), each trial involved either a 
pleasant/unpleasant word or a photograph of a red/blue team member presented 
centrally, with both sets of category labels Pleasant/Unpleasant and Red Team/Blue 
Team presented in left and right top corners of the display. Participants pressed the 
appropriate button to classify the words as pleasant/unpleasant and the photographs as 
red/blue team. This condition was either Congruent, in which own-team/pleasant and 
other-team/unpleasant were associated with the same response, or Incongruent in which 
own-team/unpleasant and other-team/pleasant were associated. Each of the eight words 
and eight photographs was presented 10 times in random order over 160 trials. Half the 
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participants performed Congruent and Incongruent conditions in Parts 3 and 5 
respectively, and half performed the reverse order. Participants' reaction times were 
recorded in these combined tasks and compared between Congruent and Incongruent 
conditions. Between the two combined tasks (Part 4), for the reversed target-concept 
discrimination, words and photographs were mapped to opposite response sides from 
those in Parts 2 and 3. To counteract any order effect, the number of trials during the 
re-association phase in Part 4 was doubled (Nosek et al. 2005), for a total of 32 trials.  
 
Explicit group identification. Finally, following the IAT, a brief questionnaire was 
used to measure explicit group-identification. Two questions were asked: “I identify 
myself with the people from the red team” and “I identify myself with the people from 
the blue team”. Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 ("I 
totally agree") to 7 ("I totally disagree"). For each participant we calculated a difference 
score as follows:  “identify with other team score – identify with own team score” 
(positive scores mean more identification with own team). One sample t-tests were used 
to compare participants’ scores against 0 (no bias in identification scores). Twenty 
participants from the behavioral experiment group and all 24 participants from the fMRI 
experiment completed the explicit group identification questionnaire. 
 
fMRI Acquisition. Functional MRI data were obtained on a 1.5 T Siemens Sonata MR 
scanner using a gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence with the following 
parameters: 42 descending horizontal slices (3.5 mm slice thickness) without gap, 
repetition time (TR) 2.5 s; echo time (TE), 40 ms; flip angle (FA), 90°; 64×64 voxels at 
3.5×3.5  mm in-plane resolution. To reduce multicollinearity, each point in the trial 
occurred at a different time point within the TR cycle. The entire brain from the vertex 
to the cerebellum was covered in the 42 slices. The first three TR periods from each 
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functional run were removed to allow for steady-state tissue magnetization. Four runs of 
211 brain images each were collected in the fMRI-judgment task, and one run of 131 
images was collected in the fMRI-passive viewing task. A three dimensional, high-
resolution T1-weighted image covering the entire brain was also acquired for 
anatomical reference (TR= 1700 ms, TE=3.91 ms, FA=15°, 192 cubic matrix, voxel 
size =1.2 cubic mm).  
 
fMRI Analyses. Data were processed and analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm), implemented in Matlab (Mathworks Inc., USA). 
Following correction for differences in timing of slice acquisition within a volume to 
the middle slice, EPI volumes were realigned to the middle image of each run for 
movement correction using a least-squares approach and six-parameter rigid body 
spatial transformations (Friston et al. 1995). A mean EPI volume was obtained during 
realignment, and the structural MRI was co-registered with that mean volume. The 
structural scan was normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) T1 
template using nonlinear basis functions. The same deformation parameters were 
applied to the EPI volumes. The EPI volumes were spatially smoothed using a 7 mm 
FWHM isotropic Gaussian filter. The time series for each voxel was high-pass filtered 
to 1/128 Hz.  
 
In the fMRI task, event-related responses to single-video presentations of own-team and 
other-team actions, and to decisions in the paired-video trials, were each modeled by the 
canonical hemodynamic response function of SPM5, together with their temporal 
derivatives. These event-related regressors were time-locked to the onset of trials for 
single-video conditions and to the decision-phase of the task for the paired video trials. 
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Specific contrasts calculated in the first-level analyses were then compared in second-
level random-effects group analysis using single-sample t-tests (Holmes and Friston, 
1998). 
 
For the single-video trials, we contrasted activation while watching action videos 
overall versus the implicit fixation baseline to identify the brain network that was 
involved in the perception of action. Crucially, we also contrasted activations recorded 
while participants watched own-team versus other-team actions, to determine whether 
group membership influences neural processes involved in action perception. In paired-
video trials, we contrasted activation when participants made explicit judgments versus 
the Press Task, to identify the network involved in making action judgments. We also 
contrasted activation for ‘own-team faster’ versus ‘other-team faster’ judgments to 
identify any differences associated with biased judgments toward in-group members. In 
the passive viewing fMRI experiment, blocks of watching own-team versus other-team 
videos were modeled by the canonical hemodynamic response function and contrasts in 
first-level analysis, and then compared across the group in second-level random-effects 
analysis using a single-sample t-test. For all contrasts, significant activation was defined 
by a cluster-level probability threshold of PFWE < 0.05 corrected for the whole brain 
search volume (with clusters defined by the voxel-level threshold P < 0.001).  
 
     Results  
Implicit Association Test (IAT). Across all 48 participants, the assignment to red and 
blue teams and the initial team competition resulted in significantly faster response 
times for the Congruent condition (686 ms, SD = 205) than for the Incongruent 
condition (758 ms, SD = 213), t(47) = -3.71, p < .001, indicating a reliably stronger 
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association between own-team members and pleasant words, and between other-team 
members and unpleasant words, than the reverse pairings.  
 
Action Judgment Task. As shown in Figure 2, we plotted the psychophysical function 
of participants’ ‘own-team faster’ judgements versus the actual time difference between 
actions in paired video clips. If group affiliation has no influence on action observation, 
then the point at which participants judge own-team actions as faster on 50% of trials 
(i.e., judging other-team actions as faster on an equal proportion of trials) should 
coincide with the physical speed of actions being identical (i.e., 0 ms time difference on 
the x-axis). Contrary to this null hypothesis, participants actually judged the actions of 
own-team members as roughly 30 ms faster than identical actions performed by other-
team members (see Figure 2). A one-sample t-test showed that this value was 
significantly different from zero or no-bias, t(23) = 6.02, p < 0.001. Across all 24 
participants, the mean R² fit of the sigmoid function was 96.8 % (SD = 3.6 %), 
indicating that individual curves accurately fitted the data for each participant.  
 
As expected, errors in accurately identifying which action was faster varied significantly 
across the 200, 133, and 67 ms time differences, F(2, 46) = 71.75; p < 0.001. 
Participants were highly accurate in judging which action was faster at the 200 ms time 
difference (M = 93.0%, SD = 8.5%), but were significantly less accurate at the 133 ms 
time difference (M = 90.0%, SD = 7.7%, t(23) = 9.29, p < 0.05), and significantly less 
accurate again at the 67 ms time difference (M = 74.0%, SD = 8.2%; t(23) = 10.72, p < 
0.001 compared with the 133 ms condition and t(23) = 9.29, p < 0.001 compared with 
the 200 ms condition). Participants showed no bias in judgments towards own-team 
members for actions with 200 ms time-differences (M = 50.3% “own-team faster” 
responses, t(23) = 0.23, p > 0.05), but showed significant biases towards own-team for 
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all other levels of time differences (i.e., >50% ‘own-team faster’ responses, p < 0.001 
for all comparisons). 
 
Functional MRI Action Perception Task. Behavioral Results. For functional MRI, 
we used a modified version of the action judgment task in which all trials showed 
actions differing in duration by only ±67 ms or 0 ms (i.e., the ‘easier’ judgments with 
±133 ms, and ±200 ms were not included). Overall, when actions depicted were exactly 
equal in duration, participants judged the actions of their own team as faster 
significantly more often (53.9 %, SD = 11.5 %) than actions of the other team (46.1 %, 
SD = 11.4 %; one-tailed, one-sample t-test: t(23) = 1.66, p = 0.05), indicating a 
significant judgment bias across the whole group. However, when looking at results of 
individual participants, it was apparent that this bias effect was somewhat weaker than 
that observed in the full action judgment task; only 13 of the 24 participants showed a 
judgment bias, selecting their own team as faster on >50% of trials. Because in the 
fMRI study we specifically aimed to examine neural activity differences related to 
group bias, we only included those participants who actually showed a bias behaviorally 
in the fMRI Action Judgment Task. When the videos were equal in duration, a one-
tailed, one-sample t-test confirmed that these 13 participants chose their own-team 
actions as faster significantly more often (60.8 %, SD = 9.6 %; t(12) = 4.04, p = 0.001). 
When own-team videos were actually faster, participants with a bias chose their own-
team as faster 83.0 % (SD = 8 %) of the time, whereas when other-team videos were 
actually faster, participants with a bias chose the other-team as faster only 70.7 % (SD = 
18 %) of the time; a one-tailed, paired t-test showed this difference to be significant, 
t(12) = 1.99, p = 0.035. 
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When re-analyzing results of the IAT task, those participants who showed no group-
bias on the judgment task also showed no significant difference between congruent (M 
= 851 ms, SD = 221) and incongruent (M = 863 ms, SD = 239) conditions of the IAT, 
t(10) = -0.34, p = .37, suggesting that they also failed to identify significantly with their 
own group. Conversely, those participants who did show a judgment bias behaviorally 
on the Action Judgment Task also showed a significantly greater affiliation with their 
own-team on the IAT (response times for congruent (M = 654 ms, SD = 104) < 
incongruent (M = 723 ms, SD = 116), one-tailed paired t-test: t(12) = -2.11, p = 0.03). 
Although it must be noted that the difference in congruent and incongruent IAT trials 
between the biased (M = -69 ms, SD = 118) and non-biased group (M=-12 ms, SD = 
116) failed to reach significance; one-way two-sample t-test, t(22) = 1.2, p = .12. 
 
Explicit group identification results. During the behavioral experiment participants 
identified more with their own team than with the other team (M=2.62, SD=1.94; t(20) 
= 6.20, p < 0.001), as measured by the questionnaire. Similarly, during the fMRI 
experiment, participants with a bias also identified more with their own team than with 
the other team (M=1.85, SD=2.19; t(12) = 3.04, p = 0.01). Participants without a bias 
failed to reach significant more own-group identification (M=1.82, SD=2.82; t(10) = 
2.14, p = 0.06) although the difference between the biased and non-biased group was 
not significant (one-way two-sample t-test, t(22) = 0.027, p = .49). 
 
 
fMRI results. fMRI analyses first focused on the single-video trials. As shown in 
Figure 3A and Supplementary Table 2, a network of brain areas including the posterior 
temporal sulcus, inferior parietal lobule and dorsal and ventral premotor cortex, was 
active across all participants when watching the single-action videos alone compared 
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with the fixation (baseline) condition. To investigate the effect of bias on action 
perception we analyzed data from participants who showed a judgment bias 
behaviorally during the paired-video trials separate from the participants who showed 
no bias. We first analyzed fMRI data from the participants with a bias. When we 
contrasted activation during observation of own-team compared with other-team actions 
during the single video trials, we found a single cluster within the left inferior parietal 
lobule (IPL; -36, -57, 51, Z = 4.12, extent 37, Pcorrected = 0.007; see Figure 5A) that was 
significantly more active when viewing own-team actions. Plots of percent signal 
change within this cluster are shown in Figure 4. As can be seen, every participant who 
showed a judgment bias behaviorally also showed greater activity in this IPL cluster 
when viewing own-team compared with other-team actions (Figure 4B, C), whereas the 
participants who showed no bias behaviorally also showed no difference in IPL 
activation (Figure 4D). As a further test, a correlation analysis in SPSS found a positive 
spearman correlation (r = .47; p = .02) across the entire group of 24 participants 
between the behavioral judgment-bias and the % signal change score difference (own 
team – other team) in this region. To further test directly if the left IPL showed a 
significantly biased response in single-video trials between the 2 groups we used the left 
IPL (anatomically defined by the WFU PickAtlas: 
http://www.fmri.wfubmc.edu/cms/software) as a region of interest analysis and 
specifically compared the own-team versus other-team contrast between the two groups 
using a two-sample t-test. This analysis showed that, in the same region of the left IPL, 
the activation difference for observation of own-team compared with other-team actions 
was significantly greater in people with a bias compared to those without a bias (-33, -
57, 51, Z = 3.85, Pcorrected = 0.027). In addition we also tested for other ROI’s, in the 
action observation network such as the right IPL, left and right STS (anatomically 
defined by combining middle and superior temporal gyrus) and left and right pars 
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opercularis and premotor cortex (anatomically defined by combining Brodmann area 44 
and 9). No significant differences between the two groups were found in the other 
ROI’s or outside the ROI’s and no significant additional activation was found in the 
people without a bias compared to the people with a bias inside or outside the ROI’s. 
This further confirms that our effect was specific to the left IPL and the people with a 
bias.  
 
For the paired-video trials, as shown in Figure 3B, we found a network of brain regions 
that were significantly more active when participants made judgments on the team 
actions compared with the baseline press left/right task. These regions included left 
inferior frontal gyrus (-42, 6, 30, Z = 4.33, extent 90, Pcorrected = 0.001), anterior 
cingulate (0, 36, 21, Z = 4.09, extent 54, Pcorrected = 0.02), the right inferior occipital 
gyrus (39, -84, -6, Z = 5.12, extent 85, Pcorrected = 0.002) and left middle occipital gyrus 
extending into the left fusiform gyrus (-36, -45, -21, Z = 4.56, extent 189, Pcorrected < 
0.001). There were no brain regions that were significantly more active during the 
decision phase when participants explicitly judged their own team as faster compared 
with judging the other team faster.  
 
Passive viewing fMRI experiment. fMRI analyses comparing watching videos versus 
baseline revealed a similar brain network to that obtained from the single-video trials of 
the main experiment (see Supplementary Figure 2 and Supplementary Table 2). This 
network included the posterior temporal sulcus, the inferior parietal lobule, and the 
dorsal and ventral premotor cortex. No significant differences in brain activation were 
found when participants passively observed own-team and other-team actions, either 
when examined exclusively for participants who showed a judgment bias behaviorally 
and when examined across the full group of 24 participants. Furthermore, there were no 
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differences related to group bias even when we focused exclusively on the left inferior 
parietal lobule at the very lenient threshold of p < 0.05 uncorrected. A paired t-test 
confirmed that the activation between own team video minus other team video showed 
significant (-39, -54, 42, Z = 3.71, extent 34, Pcorrected = 0.039) more activation in the 
people with a bias in the judgment experiment compared with the passive viewing 
experiment. 
      
Discussion 
 
In our behavioral action-judgment experiment we showed that individuals arbitrarily 
assigned to a team rapidly form group associations and that these associations bias 
subjective judgments of the speed of actions of own-team and other-team members. In 
our fMRI experiment we found that this judgment bias is associated with increased 
activity in the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL) during the observation of own-team 
actions compared with other-team actions.  Because we only tested male participants 
our results might only be valid for this population and further testing needs to be done 
to see if these findings extent to females also.  
 
Our findings suggest that brain mechanisms underlying action perception are influenced 
by group biases. Neural responses in the IPL were enhanced during the perception of 
own-group compared with other-group actions in those participants who showed a 
group bias behaviorally. As outlined earlier, distinct brain processes exist for the direct 
simulation or ‘mirroring’ of others’ actions and these have also been shown to be 
influenced by social relationships (Molnar-Szakacs et al. 2007; Rizzolatti and Fabbri-
Destro, 2008). The IPL is a crucial region in this ‘mirroring network’ and is known to 
be involved in transforming visual representations of actions to the motor system for 
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action perception (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Fabbi-Destro and Rizzolatti, 2008; 
Molenberghs et al. 2012a). It should be noted that, because we did not include a 
movement execution condition, we cannot make conclusions directly about mirror 
neuron involvement in this study. Even shared activity between action execution and 
observation conditions would not necessarily imply mirror neurons (Gazzola and 
Keysers, 2009). Nonetheless, there is overwhelming evidence that the IPL has an active 
role in action observation. Single-cell recordings in monkeys (Fogassi et al. 2005) and 
fMRI studies in humans (Molenberghs et al. 2012b) have shown that neurons in the 
inferior parietal cortex respond differently to the observation of actions depending on 
the context in which they are performed. Our results further suggest that neural 
responses to observed actions in the IPL are influenced by social context.  
 
It is not clear why the in-group effect we observed within the IPL was lateralised to the 
left hemisphere, and further research will be needed to clarify this issue. One possibility, 
however, is that the right-handed actions our participants viewed were mapped to 
anatomically congruent motor representations of the contralateral hemisphere. There is 
increasing evidence that observed actions are mapped onto corresponding cortical 
regions based upon the laterality of the hand depicted in the action and the observer’s 
perspective (Shmuelof and Zohary, 2008). In recent work from our own lab, Bortoletto 
et al. (2011) showed that when people plan actions, neural activity associated with the 
observed action is strongest contralateral to the observed effector (i.e., the N170 over 
left lateral parietal cortex for right-hand movement). Molenberghs et al. (2010) similarly 
found that parietal mirror neuron activation related to observation and execution of 
right-handed actions was restricted to the left hemisphere. In the current study, 
participants had all practiced performing the actions with their right-hand while 
concurrently watching the video clips during the group consolidation stage. Therefore, 
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the observed actions in the video clips would have been associated with equivalent 
right-hand actions previously performed by the observers. 
 
Our results are consistent with the idea that observation of own-team actions led to a 
greater degree of “automatic imitation” or mapping of observed actions, by the left IPL, 
to equivalent motor representations for right-hand movement. A recent EEG study 
(Gutsell and Inzlicht, 2010) found that participants with higher prejudice show less mu 
suppression (which is used as an index of mirror neuron activity during action 
observation) in the left parietal lobe during observation of out-group actions compared 
to in-group actions. Past research has also shown that participants are more likely to 
imitate a person if he or she is perceived as an in-group rather than out-group member 
(Yabar et al. 2006), and the IPL is known to play a key role in imitation (Mühlau et al. 
2005; Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006; Molenberghs et al. 2009, 2010). Further, other 
regions involved in action observation, such as the pars opercularis of the inferior 
frontal gyrus, seem to be less involved in imitation (Molenberghs et al. 2010), which 
may explain why it was only activation in the IPL that was significantly influenced by 
group bias. Overall, our results show that established social relationships between 
individuals can mediate neural activity within the IPL during action perception. 
 
A previous fMRI study investigating bias in artificial groups (Van Bavel et al. 2008) 
found greater brain activation in the fusiform gyrus, a region responsible for face 
perception, while watching novel in-group faces compared to novel out-group faces. 
Similarly, it is possible that in our experiment participants attended more closely to 
actions of own-team members than to those of other-team members, and that the 
increased IPL activation when viewing own-team actions represents an attentional 
modulation of normal IPL activity for perception of action. Perhaps actions of in-group 
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members are more salient, either for reasons of social cognition, enhancing motor-
simulation mechanisms operating via the mirror system (Uddin et al. 2007), or by virtue 
of our tendency to imitate in-group compared with out-group members and to form 
social bonds within groups (Yabar et al. 2006). It must be noted, however, that 
activation differences for own-team compared with other-team actions in our study was 
only present in the main fMRI experiment. In the separate, ‘passive-viewing’ (single-
video) condition, with identical video clips, no difference was evident for neural 
activation associated with own-team versus other-team videos. It is therefore unlikely 
that the group-bias effects simply reflected low-level salience or feature-based 
attentional selection, perhaps primed or induced by Red- and Blue-team based 
instructions. While these results suggest that the group-bias effects we report are not 
simply driven by differences in visual properties or bottom-up visual salience of the 
videos, results of this passive-viewing task must be interpreted with caution. Group 
membership becomes more salient in a competitive context such as the Action 
Judgment Task compared to a situation in which the distinctiveness is not emphasized 
such as the Passive Viewing Task, and a possible limitation (although common practice 
with functional localiser tasks) is that the Passive Viewing Task was always presented 
after the Action Judgment Task.   
 
While participants in both the behavioral and fMRI judgment tasks showed a significant 
judgment bias on average across the groups, in the fMRI experiment only 13 out of 24 
participants (compared to 21 out of 24 in the behavioral experiment) actually showed a 
judgment bias towards their own team. This discrepancy might arise from the difference 
between the two judgment experiments. Crucially, the fMRI judgment task was 
modified in a way that only two conditions were included related to video duration 
compared to the four different video-length conditions of the behavioral experiment. 
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This modification was carried out to remove the “obvious” trials (i.e., those with a large 
time difference) and increase the number of trials with equal video clip durations. It is 
possible, however, that by removing those conditions for which the difference between 
video lengths was very salient, all trials became relatively hard to judge for the 
participants. This might have led some of the less motivated participants to answer in a 
random manner on some of the trials of the fMRI judgment task. For the fMRI analyses 
we therefore divided the participants in two groups based on their judgment bias score 
in the paired video trials because we only expected a difference in neural responses in 
those participants who actually showed a judgment bias behaviorally. Crucially every 
participant who showed a judgment bias also showed greater activity in the left IPL 
cluster when viewing own-team compared with other-team actions. On the IAT task, 
although participants who showed a group bias identified significantly with their team 
and participants without a bias did not, the difference between the two groups was not 
significant. This is not surprising given the relatively small number of participants in 
each group and the fact that others have found no strong linear relationship between 
group identification and in-group bias (Hinkle & Brown 1990, Mullen et al. 1992). 
Although group identification is a necessary condition for in-group bias it is not 
sufficient. People can identify with their group without showing a bias against the out-
group.  
 
Making explicit judgments on which team was faster involved activation of the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). The ACC is well known to be 
involved in decision making (Botvinick, 2007), and the IFG is specifically involved in 
perceptual decision making in uncertain situations (Heekeren et al. 2008).  We found no 
difference in brain activity related to group bias during the decision phase, when 
participants selected own-team actions as faster than when they selected other-team 
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actions as faster. Previously, neural activity in the anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala, 
and prefrontal cortex has been reported to be influenced by group membership 
(Richeson et al. 2003; Cunningham et al. 2004; Rilling et al. 2008; Volz et al. 2009); 
however, noticeable differences between those studies and ours might explain why we 
did not find significant differences in brain activity in these areas. In our study, 
participants were allocated to purely arbitrary groups rather than into pre-existing ethnic 
or racial groups as in previous studies (Richeson et al. 2003; Cunningham et al. 2004); 
although other studies show that race can be ignored if it is put orthogonal to new group 
membership, especially when group membership is made very salient (Van Bavel et al., 
2008). Tasks in previous studies have also involved monetary rewards or games in 
which win-loss situations were salient (Rilling et al. 2008; Volz et al. 2009). In contrast, 
participants in our study were asked merely to observe in-group and out-group 
members' actions to judge the relative speed of hand movements, with no feedback or 
reward for their judgments. People are likely to apply more cognitive effort to override 
their own biases when tasks clearly involve racial categorization or intergroup 
competition, and where rewards or benefits are associated with judgments related to the 
in-group (see Amodio, 2008, for a review).  
 
To conclude, we have shown for the first time that neural responses in the inferior 
parietal cortex during observation of actions are modulated depending on the social 
context in which they are imbedded. Our results suggest that the neural mechanisms that 
underlie action perception are biased by group membership, and imply that group 
members often do not see the actions of their own team objectively.  
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Figure 1 – Schematic of the Action Judgment Task. A. Paired-video trials. Half of all 
trials began with the text "your team", followed by a video of an own-team member 
performing a reaching button-press action. The text "other team" was then presented, 
followed by the second video of the other-team member’s action. The order of videos 
was reversed for the other half of trials. Finally, the question "Who was faster?" and the 
two possible choices, "Your team" or "Other team", were presented. In the baseline 
Press Task the final stimulus screen instructed participants to “Press Left” or “Press 
Right”, rather than judging “Who was faster?”. Participants indicated their response by 
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pressing a left or right response button. B. For the single-video trials, only the initial 
“Your Team” or “Other Team” text and the relevant video clip were presented, with a 
fixation cross presented for the remainder of the inter-trial interval (5500 ms). Note that 
in the actual experiment videos of real people were used. 
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Figure 2 – Perceptual judgments in the Action Judgment Task, plotted as a function of 
the real time differences between actions in the videos. The data points are fitted by a 3-
parameter sigmoid function. Y-axis: Percentage of trials in which participants judged 
the action of their own team member as faster than that of the other team member. X-
axis: The real time difference (in ms) between own-team and other-team actions in the 
videos, measured from the onset of movement until the hand reached the button. 
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Figure 3 – Brain activation results from the fMRI study. A. Action-perception network. 
Brain activation differences while watching videos of hand actions in the single-video 
trials compared with a fixation baseline condition, displayed on a rendered brain in 
MRIcron (Puncorrected < 0.001, cluster-size threshold > 25 voxels). B. Brain activation 
differences in left inferior frontal gyrus and anterior cingulate cortex during explicit 
judgments on own-team versus other-team actions in the paired-video trials, compared 
with the press-left/right (baseline) task, displayed on a rendered brain in MRIcron 
(Puncorrected < 0.001, cluster-size threshold > 25 voxels).
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Figure 4 – Brain activation results relating to group bias in the fMRI Action Perception 
study. A. Brain activation differences in the single-video trials when observing own-
team compared with other-team actions. Left inferior parietal activation on coronal, 
axial and sagittal sections, and on rendered brain, displayed at a threshold of Puncorrected < 
0.001, cluster-size threshold 25 voxels. B. Difference in percentage signal change 
within the significant left IPL cluster (mean of all voxels in the whole cluster calculated 
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with marsbar (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/)) when observing own-team compared 
with other-team actions, plotted for each of the participants who showed a judgment 
bias behaviorally in the fMRI experiment. C. Mean percentage signal change within the 
significant left IPL cluster for the participants who showed a judgment bias behaviorally 
when observing own-team compared with other-team actions (error bars are one 
standard error of the mean). D. Mean percentage signal change within the same left IPL 
cluster for the participants who showed no judgment bias behaviorally (error bars are 
one standard error of the mean).  
 
  
 
    Supplementary Material: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 1 – Examples of Congruent and Incongruent conditions in the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Parts 3 and 5) for a participant assigned to the red team. 
In the congruent condition, own-team members and pleasant words were associated with 
the same response (left button-press in this example), and other-team members and 
unpleasant words were associated with the other response (right button-press). In the 
incongruent condition, own-team members and unpleasant words were associated with 
the same response (left button), and other-team members and pleasant words were 
associated with the other response (right button). Note that in the actual experiment 
pictures of real people were used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 2 – Brain activation results from the passive viewing fMRI 
study. Brain activation while watching videos of hand actions compared with a fixation 
baseline condition, displayed on a rendered brain in MRIcron (Puncorrected < 0.001).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Supplementary Table 1. Overview of the 32 possible combinations of video clips. YT = 
your team (own-team) video clip. OT = other-team video clip. The order defines which 
video is presented first. The times in headings represent the durations of the actions  
depicted in the videos, from the onset of movement till the hand reaches the button (in 
ms). The time difference between YT and OT actions defines the condition. 
 
 YT 233.33 YT 300 YT 366.67 YT 433.33 
OT 233.33 YT 233.33 vs OT 233.33  
OT 233.33 vs YT 233.33  
0 ms condition  
YT 300 vs OT 233.33  
OT 233.33 vs YT 300  
- 67 ms condition 
YT 366.67 vs OT 233.33  
OT 233.33 vs YT 366.67  
- 133 ms condition 
YT 433.33 vs OT 233.33  
OT 233.33 vs YT 433.33  
- 200 ms condition 
OT 300 YT 233.33 vs OT 300  
OT 300 vs YT 233.33  
+ 67 ms condition 
YT 300 vs OT 300  
OT 300 vs YT 300  
0 ms condition 
YT 366.67 vs OT 300  
OT 300 vs YT 366.67  
- 67 ms condition 
YT 433.33 vs OT 300  
OT 300 vs YT 433.33  
- 133 ms condition 
OT 366.67 YT 233.33 vs OT 366.67 
OT 366.67 vs YT 233.33  
+ 133 ms condition 
YT 300 vs OT 366.67  
OT 366.67 vs YT 300  
+ 67 ms condition 
YT 366.67 vs OT 366.67  
OT 366.67 vs YT 366.67  
0 ms condition 
YT 433.33 vs OT 366.67  
OT 366.67vs YT 433.33  
- 67 ms condition 
OT 433.33 YT 233.33 vs OT 433.33  
OT 433.33 vs YT 233.33  
+ 200 ms condition 
YT 300 vs OT 433.33  
OT 433.33 vs YT 300  
+ 133 ms condition 
YT 366.67  vs OT 433.33  
OT 433.33 vs YT 366.67   
+ 67 ms condition 
YT 433.33 vs OT 433.33  
OT 433.33 vs YT 433.33  
0 ms condition 
  
